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Our preferences are shaped by past experience in many ways, but a systematic understanding 
of the factors is yet to be achieved. For example, studies of the mere exposure effect show that 
experience with an item leads to increased liking (familiarity preference), but the exact opposite 
tendency is found in other studies utilizing dishabituation (novelty preference). Recently, it has 
been found that image category affects whether familiarity or novelty preference emerges from 
repeated stimulus exposure (Park et al., 2010). Faces elicited familiarity preference, but natural 
scenes elicited novelty preference. In their task, preference judgments were made throughout 
all exposures, raising the question of whether the task-context during exposure was involved. 
We adapt their paradigm, testing if passive exposure or objective judgment task-contexts lead 
to different results. Results showed that after passive viewing, familiar faces were preferred, but 
no preference bias in either direction was found with natural scenes, or with geometric figures 
(control). After exposure during the objective judgment task, familiar faces were preferred, 
novel natural scenes were preferred, and no preference bias was found with geometric figures. 
The overall results replicate the segregation of preference biases across object categories and 
suggest that the preference for familiar faces and novel natural scenes are modulated by task-
context memory at different processing levels or selection involvement. Possible underlying 
mechanisms of the two types of preferences are discussed.
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face stimuli, repeated faces became increasingly preferred as the 
sub-block progressed. Meanwhile, for natural scenes, new stimuli 
quickly became preferred over the old one. For geometric figures, 
no strong preference bias was found in either direction.
While  this  segregation  of  novelty  vs.  familiarity  preference 
between faces and natural scenes was replicated across a wide 
range of conditions in Park et al. (2010), the preference for novel 
natural scenes is inconsistent with studies of the mere exposure 
effect (e.g., Zajonc, 1968; Zajonc et al., 1972; Bornstein, 1989). 
Based on these studies, the preference for the repeated stimulus 
should have increased rather than decreased. This inconsistency 
cannot be explained based on stimulus types, since studies have 
shown the mere exposure effect to exist across among a wide range 
of stimulus types, such as words (Zajonc, 1968; Monahan et al., 
2000; Topolinski and Strack, 2009; Garcia-Marques et al., 2010), 
photographs (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992; Crisp et al., 2009), 
polygons (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992), random-dot patterns 
(de Vries et al., 2010), line drawings (Hupbach et al., 2006), and 
most relevantly, colorful paintings (Zajonc et al., 1972) which are 
similar to the natural scene pictures used in Park et al. (2010).
There is one noticeable difference in procedure that may account 
for the difference, which is the differing task-contexts in which 
the repeated pictures were experienced. In Park et al. (2010), par-
ticipants were requested to make preference judgments with each 
  stimulus  presentation.  Meanwhile,  mere  exposure  experiments 
IntroductIon
Experience affects our preferences in a variety of different, some-
times contradictory ways. Our preferences sometimes lean toward 
things we have not previously experienced, such as novel new 
products or shops. On the other hand, we sometime prefer things 
because we have extensive experience with them, such as familiar 
faces or items that evoke nostalgia (e.g., Houston-Price and Nakai, 
2004). Scientific research has generally uncovered and investigated 
these trends separately. In the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968, 
2001), familiar things are preferred over novel ones. Meanwhile 
other studies utilize effects such as dishabituation, where novel 
visual objects/places are preferred (e.g., Fantz, 1964; Berlyne, 1970; 
Olst, 1971; Bevins and Bardo, 1999; Klebaur and Bardo, 1999).
The results may have varied because they had been obtained 
from different paradigms, subjects, and species. In a recent study 
that directly opposed the two effects within a single paradigm, Park 
et al. (2010) showed that the two bases of preference, novelty and 
familiarity, have different patterns of dominance across different 
object categories. In a visual comparison paradigm, participants 
rated their relative preference between a pair of pictures presented 
side-by-side. In a given experimental sub-block, one of the pictures 
was presented in every trial, and thus became increasingly familiar. 
The other picture was new for each trial, and so was always novel. 
Three different picture types were tested: faces, natural scenes, and 
geometric figures, with each image category tested separately. For Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 43  |  2
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either stimuli roundness, color, or complexity) to see if prefer-
ences are modulated by type of processing. We examine whether 
introducing these different task-contexts of stimulus experience 
modulates the preference for familiar faces and novel natural 
scenes found in Park et al. (2010).
ExpErImEnt 1: prEsEncE or absEncE of a  
judgmEnt task
This experiment aims to examine whether the segregation of pref-
erence for familiar faces and novel natural scenes can be formed 
under conditions of mere exposure. In the experience phase, par-
ticipants were not requested to do any judgment but just to watch 
the pairs of stimuli. Afterward, in a preference judgment phase, 
participants were given an unexpected task to rate their relative 
preference between the two items in each subsequent trial. We 
measured whether there was any preference bias toward familiar 
faces or novel natural scenes immediately after the exposure.
Both the mere exposure effect and the original results from Park 
et al. (2010) indicate that we should expect the familiar faces to be 
preferred over novel ones. For natural scenes, the expected results 
of mere exposure effect and Park et al. (2010) diverge. If Park et al.’s 
(2010) findings of novelty preference were caused by the presence of 
a judgment task during the exposure phase, then we would expect 
the present manipulation to cause a reversion to the familiarity 
preference found in the mere exposure effect.
mEthods
Participants
Twenty adults (graduates, undergraduates, and staff at Caltech 
or National Taiwan University) who were naïve about the pur-
pose of this study participated in this experiment. Three were 
Caucasians, one was Latino, and 16 were Asians. The Caltech or 
NTU Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects approved 
the experiment and the informed consent was obtained from all 
the participants.
Stimuli
The stimuli were presented on a 20-inch LaCie monitor (LaCie 
Electron 22 Blue IV) controlled by a Dell personal computer. We 
used the same visual stimuli and attractiveness pre-rating data as 
used in Park et al. (2010): Three categories of pictures – faces, 
natural scenes, and geometric figures – were used. The geomet-
ric figures were used as control, as Park et al. (2010) found them 
to elicit no strong choice bias. Faces were generated by FaceGen 
(Singular Inversions Inc.) software in 16 subcategories: 4 races 
(Asian, African, Indian, and European) × 2 genders × 2 ages (old 
and young). Natural scenes were color photos collected from public 
websites in eight subcategories: animal, food, flower, mountain, sky, 
lake, ocean, and desert. Geometric figures were Fourier descriptors 
generated by a Matlab program (MathWorks Inc.) with properties 
in one of the four combinations: symmetry vs. asymmetry × sim-
ple vs. complex. The geometric figures were randomly assigned 
into eight subcategories. Each subcategory of images contained 
27 pictures and the one that received the median attractiveness 
rating was used as the “old,” or repeated, picture. This was to avoid 
introducing an initial bias in preference choice toward the novel 
or familiar stimuli.
typically present the repeated stimulus in a passive viewing context 
(hence “mere” exposure), with preference judgments being elicited 
only after the exposure period (e.g., Zajonc et al., 1972; Bornstein 
and D’Agostino, 1992; Monahan et al., 2000). Performing a prefer-
ence judgment on each presentation may alter the depth and/or 
type of processing of the stimulus and thus may change the effects 
of exposure on preference.
For instance, it is possible that the explicit evaluation task per-
formed in each trial leads to stronger habituation over repeated 
stimuli, offsetting the mere exposure effect and leading to a novelty 
preference for natural scenes. Such an effect of processing depth 
(Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) is 
hypothesized to have influence on preferences that familiarity pref-
erence depends on automatic processing, whereas novelty prefer-
ence requires more controlled cognitive processing. Accordingly, 
tendencies toward familiarity preference would require only passive 
exposures, whereas tendencies toward novelty preference would 
require active judgment during exposure. This hypothesis would 
predict that changing Park et al.’s (2010) procedure to passive view-
ing of the stimuli should reduce or abolish the novelty preference 
for natural scenes.
Another hypothesis is that what is critical is not so much of 
depth of processing but rather type of processing: that is, different 
types of tasks may elicit different types of memory processing, 
leading to different effects on novelty and familiarity preferences. 
It may be the active evaluation of preference in particular that 
leads to the novelty preference. Such an effect of processing type 
is suggested by a combination of studies. Shimojo et al. (2003) 
showed that patterns of gaze orienting contribute to preference 
judgment, but not as much to other, objective types of judgment. 
They hypothesized that there exists a feedback loop between gaze 
orienting and preference judgments in particular. Because gaze 
orientation is attracted by novel visual stimuli (Fantz, 1964; Wu 
and Remington, 2003), the active engagement of gaze mechanisms 
by an explicit preference choice task may enhance a preference 
for novel stimuli. This alternative hypothesis would predict that 
changing Park et al.’s (2010) procedure to use an objective judg-
ment during the exposure phase would reduce the novelty pref-
erence, as objective judgment engages the gaze mechanisms to a 
lesser extent.
Therefore the current study examines whether the familiar-
ity and the novelty preferences found in Park et al. (2010) are 
based on different mechanisms, and how the level and/or type of 
processing during exposure matters in that regard. The results will 
hopefully assist us in resolving the inconsistency of the results in 
the literature. In two experiments, we manipulated task presence 
and task type during exposure to examine whether and how the 
hypothesized factors affect familiarity and novelty preferences in a 
subsequent preference test. The experiments use the same stimuli 
and methods as Park et al. (2010), but we divide the experiment 
into two phases: an experience phase followed by a preference judg-
ment phase. In Experiment 1, passive viewing of stimuli with no 
preference judgment was conducted during the experience phase, 
as in the typical mere exposure effect study, to see if preferences are 
modulated by depth of processing. In Experiment 2, we restored 
the presence of an explicit judgment task, but instead of a prefer-
ence judgment, we used an objective judgment task (comparing www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 43  |  3
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indicator frame (36° × 1.5°) was located 12.7° below to the central 
point. The indicator showed “0” initially in each trial and could be 
adjusted from “1” to “3” in either direction, right or left, to indicate 
the relative preference rating.
rEsults
The preference rating was coded as a positive value (i.e., +1 to 
+3) if the repeated “old” picture was preferred, and negative value 
if the new picture was preferred. To evaluate the impact of the 
experience phase, we analyzed the first preference rating of each 
sub-block in the judgment phase (i.e., the first time a given old 
picture was subjected to a preference judgment). Figure 2 (black 
bars) shows the mean initial ratings within each stimulus category, 
with error bars indicating standard errors of the mean across 
participants. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA against image 
category revealed that there were significant differences among 
the three object categories [F(2,19) = 6.94, MSE = 2.31, p < 0.01] 
and Tukey’s test showed a significant difference between faces and 
natural scenes (p < 0.01).
To evaluate whether there was any significant choice bias toward 
the familiar or novel picture, we tested the initial ratings for signifi-
cant deviation from 0 with one-sample t-tests. The results showed 
that the familiar faces were significantly preferred [t(19) = 4.14, 
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.93], but no preference bias toward either 
familiarity or novelty was found in natural scenes [t(19) = −1.49, 
p > 0.1, Cohen’s d = −0.33] nor in geometric figures [t(19) = 1.51, 
p > 0.1, Cohen’s d = 0.34].
As participants completed additional preference judgment trials 
on the paired stimuli, the preference for familiar faces increased fur-
ther, and a preference for novel natural scenes emerged (Figure 3). 
By the sixth preference trial, novel natural scenes were significantly 
preferred over familiar ones [t(19) = −2.57, p < 0.02, Cohen’s 
d = −0.58], consistent with Park et al.’s (2010) original study.
Design
The experiment consisted of two phases: an experience phase (20 
trials × 8 subcategories × 3 categories) and a preference judgment 
phase (6 trials × 8 subcategories × 3 categories). In each phase, the 
three categories of pictures were run in different blocks, with the 
sequence of blocks randomly assigned to each participant. Within 
each block, the eight subcategories were run in different sub-blocks. 
Among the 16 available subcategories for faces, the eight assigned to 
a given participant were composed of faces of the participants’ own 
race, and another randomly chosen race (2 races × 2 genders × 2 
ages). For natural scenes and geometric figures, all eight subcate-
gories in the image set were used. The order of subcategories was 
randomized within the block.
Task
During the experience phase, participants viewed pairs of pic-
tures on the screen, with an unlimited, self-paced viewing time 
for each trial (however they were encouraged to just take glances). 
To encourage the participants to pay some attention to the stimuli, 
they were told that they would complete a questionnaire regard-
ing the pictures afterward (but the questionnaire was not actually 
implemented). Participants were not informed of the existence of 
the preference judgment phase of the experiment until the expe-
rience phase was completed. In the preference judgment phase, 
participants were requested to make a relative preference judg-
ment on each pair of pictures. The response was made by moving 
a cursor along an indicator frame to score the relative preference 
rating on a scale from 1 to 3 toward the right or left picture. Zero 
was allowed to indicate no preference for either picture (thus in 
effect, it was a 7-point scale).
Figure 1 shows the stimulus display and sample stimuli. In each 
trial, an old and a new picture were presented side-by-side on the 
screen. The left–right ordering of the old and new pictures was 
randomized in each trial. The center of each picture was located 10° 
of visual angle from the central point. Face pictures were 12° × 12°, 
natural scenes were 15° × 12° (horizontally oriented), and geo-
metric figures were 17° × 12°. In the response phase, a response 
Figure 1 | Stimuli and procedure. (A) Sample judgment phase trial with 
natural scene images. (B) Examples of face and geometric figure images.
Figure 2 | Mean preference bias among initial preference judgments in 
experiments 1 and 2. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences from 0.Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 43  |  4
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et al. (2010). This provides both negative and positive evidence that 
the novelty preference for natural scenes requires a task-context 
judgment during exposure.
ExpErImEnt 2: typE of judgmEnt task
Novelty preference for natural scenes was found when the subjec-
tive preference judgment is requested on each trial but not found 
after passive viewing experience, indicating that mere exposure is 
not sufficient to lead to novelty preference for natural scenes. It 
suggests that a deeper level of processing engaged by the selection 
task might be needed for novelty preference formation. However, it 
is unclear whether the necessary processing is specifically engaged 
by preference choices, or if the processing is engaged by selection 
tasks in general.
In this experiment, we examined this question by imposing 
objective judgment tasks (e.g., rating relative color of the natural 
scenes), rather than a subjective preference evaluation during the 
exposure phase. This evokes controlled selection processes without 
involving preference processes. If the judgment of preference needs 
to be carried out to elicit novelty preference for natural scenes, then 
objective judgment during the experience phase should not lead 
to novelty preference for natural scenes. However, if the conduct 
of any kind of selection judgment is sufficient to lead to novelty 
preference for natural scenes, a preference bias toward novel natural 
scenes is expected immediately after the experience phase.
We also examined how the objective evaluation would affect 
the preference for familiar faces, as the literature points in various 
directions. Halberstadt and Hooton (2008; also see Wilson et al., 
1993) found that subjects prompted to report analytic reasons for 
liking or disliking a painting gave lower numeric ratings for how 
much they liked the painting, as compared to control subjects who 
only had to rate how much they liked the painting. In addition, the 
authors showed that there was a significant correlation between lik-
ing ratings and process fluency for control subjects, but this correla-
tion disappeared in subjects who had been prompted for analytic 
reasoning. If analytic reasoning disrupts the connection between 
stimulus process fluency and the degree to which the stimulus is 
liked, then we would expect that the introduction of an objective 
task with analytic evaluation in our experiment might disrupt the 
preference for familiar faces. In contrast, according to the perceptual 
fluency account for familiarity preference (Mandler et al., 1987), it is 
possible that conducting the objective judgment may still facilitate 
perceptual fluency and thus lead to familiarity preference, just as 
repeated preference judgment does.
In this experiment, we examine the predictions from these 
hypotheses by introducing objective judgment during the experi-
ence phase. If the objective judgment disrupts stimulus process flu-
ency, a disruption of the familiarity preference for faces is expected. 
Alternatively, if perceptual fluency is robust to task involvement, 
familiarity preference for faces should still be expected.
mEthods
Participants
Another group of 20 adults as described before participated in the 
main experiment. Five were Caucasians and the rest were Asians. 
Another group of 10 adults pre-rated the stimuli for objective 
attributes.
dIscussIon
The results showed that, while there was preference for familiar 
faces, no preference bias toward either familiarity or novelty was 
found in natural scenes immediately following the exposure phase, 
despite 20 repetitions of task-free exposure to each “old” picture. 
The result of natural scenes is inconsistent with the mere expo-
sure effect (e.g., Zajonc et al., 1972), where repeatedly presented 
images were preferred; and also inconsistent with Park et al. (2010), 
where the repeatedly presented natural scenes were shown to be 
less preferred.
There are two alternative explanations as for why the mere 
exposure effect was not observed for natural scenes. One may 
result from the way the stimuli were presented in this study. Here, 
a pair of pictures was presented side-by-side, whereas in the typical 
mere exposure effect study (e.g., Zajonc, 1968; Zajonc et al., 1972; 
Bornstein, 1989), only one picture was viewed in each exposure. 
Paired presentations may lead to unbalanced examination dura-
tions if there is an attentional bias between the pictures. Another 
possibility is that the mere exposure effect may have been abolished 
by an overexposure effect (e.g., Zajonc et al., 1972; Williams, 1987) 
in the way that excessive exposure to the same stimulus induces 
aversion. These explanations do not account for the results of the 
face category, which showed familiarity preference after the same 
way and the same number of stimulus presentations as natural 
scenes, but it is possible that different object types may have differ-
ent memory effects in preference (see more in General Discussion).
That there was no novelty preference bias in the natural scenes 
was inconsistent with Park et al. (2010), indicating that the devel-
opment of a novelty preference for natural scenes requires the 
performance of the preference judgment task during exposure. 
Park et al. (2010) found a rapidly developing bias toward novelty 
preference that saturated after about five trials, and that sustained 
across at least 26 trials. With the preference task removed in our 
experiment, 20 trials of exposure still failed to elicit a significant 
preference bias. Further, our subsequent implementation of six 
preference judgment trials was sufficient to recover the preference 
bias effect to approximately the same magnitude as found in Park 
Figure 3 | Timelines of preference bias in experiment 1. Data points are 
trial-by-trial means of ratings rectified toward the repeated image. Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean.www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 43  |  5
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p < 0.04, Cohen’s d = −0.50] was immediately present after the 
experience phase with objective judgments, but no bias was present 
for geometric figures [t(19) = −0.14, p > 0.8, Cohen’s d = −0.03].
To further examine whether depth of processing or selection 
made a difference in preference bias for familiar face and novel 
natural scenes, we conducted a direct comparison between the two 
experiments. An ANOVA on the initial preference ratings with the 
three object categories as the within-subject variable and the two 
experiments as the between-subject variable showed the main effect 
of object category [F(2,76) = 12.10, MSE = 5.20, p < 0.001], but not 
the main effect of experiment [F(1,38) = 1.74, MSE = 0.85, p > 0.1] 
nor the two-way interaction [F(2,76) = 0.16, MSE = 0.07, p > 0.8].
dIscussIon
The results showed that after the experience phase, which involved 
the objective evaluation of the color-temperature of the pictures, 
novel natural scenes were immediately preferred over the familiar 
ones. Whereas Experiment 1 indicated that a judgment task was 
necessary for stimulus experience to elicit novelty preference for 
natural scenes, this experiment indicates that the judgment task 
need not be one based on preference. This experiment also repli-
cates the finding of familiarity preference for faces, as well as the 
significant difference between face and natural scene stimuli.
Regarding the familiarity preference for faces, we did not find 
evidence that the objective evaluation of visual features (round-
ness) disrupted process fluency or its connection to the prefer-
ence response. However, other studies have shown that analyzing 
and reasoning the liking (e.g., Wilson et al., 1993; Halberstadt and 
Hooton, 2008) has such an effect. The discrepancy between the 
current result and previous studies in preference formation may be 
explained by that objective judgment on just a single visual feature 
is not sufficient to interfere with preference attitudes. Alternatively, 
it may be differences between the tasks in processing depth, time, 
or effort. Yet another possibility would be that there is something 
special in faces (see review in Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006) that leads 
to a more robust familiarity preference. In any case, the current 
result is consistent with the perceptual fluency account (Mandler 
et al., 1987) in that the familiarity preference for faces is caused 
by the general process fluency at the perceptual level and is not 
affected by specific type of objective evaluation.
In post hoc interviews of participants in the two experiments, all 
of the participants noticed that there was a repeatedly presented 
stimulus but none of them reported that their preference choice 
was based on it. This suggests that the preference biases found here 
may be driven by implicit processing (e.g., Shimojo et al., 2003; 
Johansson et al., 2005). When asked for the reasons behind their 
preferences, some participants named random attributes such as 
the brightness of the picture, a cheerful feeling, or just intuition. 
Whether familiarity preference for faces and novelty preference for 
natural scenes are modulated by different mechanisms or different 
depths of processing (or both), it appears that experience affects 
the preference through such implicit processing.
gEnEral dIscussIon
In two experiments, repeated exposure to a face led to a preference 
bias toward that face whether or not a judgment task was con-
ducted during stimulus exposure. In contrast, repeated exposure to 
Stimuli, design, and procedure
Stimuli, design, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, 
except for the following: First, the pictures chosen to be “old” or 
repeated pictures in this experiment were the ones receiving median 
ratings both in terms of their attractiveness and their objective 
attributes. This was done so that the stimulus itself would not bias 
choice toward the old or new picture in either the objective or 
preference judgment phases. In pre-rating sessions, participants 
were asked to rate with a 7-point scale (from 1 to 7): the round-
ness of each face, the overall color-temperature of each natural 
scene (higher score = warmer color content, e.g., redness), and the 
complexity of each geometric figure. All the pictures were ranked 
for both attractiveness and objective attributes within each sub-
category, and pictures possessing median ratings in both rankings 
were selected as the “old” pictures.
Second, in the main experiment, during the experience phase, 
participants were required to make a relative judgment regarding 
an object feature for each pair of pictures. For faces they had to 
rate their relative roundness (from +3 to −3), for natural scenes 
their relative overall color-temperature, and for geometric figures 
their relative complexity.
rEsults
Results are shown in Figure 4. As expected, during the experience 
phase where objective judgments were performed, there was no 
systematic tendency for ratings toward familiar or novel pictures 
by exposed trials in any object categories (all R2s < 0.2, ps > 0.07). 
In contrast, there was a progressively accumulating preference bias 
toward familiar faces and novel natural scenes during preference 
judgment phase (both R2s > 0.7, ps < 0.03).
Figure 2 (gray bars) shows the mean coded ratings given for 
the initial preference trials. An ANOVA revealed the main effect 
of object categories [F(2,19) = 5.62, MSE = 2.96, p < 0.01] and 
Tukey’s test revealed a significant difference between faces and natu-
ral scenes (p < 0.01). One-sample t-tests of the initial ratings showed 
that, preference bias toward familiar faces [t(19) = 2.79, p < 0.02, 
Cohen’s d = 0.62] and toward novel natural scenes [t(19) = −2.22, 
Figure 4 | Timelines of rating bias in experiment 2. Data points are 
trial-by-trial means of ratings rectified toward the repeated image. Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean.Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 43  |  6
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studies showing that familiarity preference is modulated by other 
factors such as mood (de Vries et al., 2010) or social context 
(Crisp et al., 2009).
We build on these perspectives by examining how preferences 
are affected by task-context, which gives us clues as to the types of 
memory processes involved. Our results demonstrate that familiar-
ity preference for faces is formed regardless whether the processing 
involves mere exposure, objective judgment, or subjective prefer-
ence judgment. This suggests that familiarity preference for faces 
may result from more bottom-up, lower-level, and non-selective 
perceptual facilitation. This is consistent with the evidence showing 
that familiarity preference is less correlated with explicit memory 
and more related to implicit memory (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 
1992). The dissociation of familiarity preference and explicit mem-
ory recognition has also been shown in taste (Adolphs et al., 2005) 
and music (Szpunar et al., 2004).
Novelty preference for natural scenes, on the other hand, seems 
to require a certain level of processing depth or selection. This may 
be related to the biased competition hypothesis for novelty prefer-
ence (Snyder et al., 2008), which suggests that novel stimuli elicit 
stimulus-driven attentional biases (i.e., novelty attracts attention) 
and that this induces the preference. There is also evidence for 
novelty place preference in animals, which appears to be based on 
novelty seeking rather than familiarity avoidance (Klebaur and 
Bardo, 1999). In accordance with the biased competition hypoth-
esis, Raymond et al. (2003) showed that, when repeated stimuli are 
ignored, they end up less preferred than attended or novel stimuli, 
indicating that attention modulates the way experience affects pref-
erences. These studies show that novelty preference is related to 
attentional selection bias, which is consistent with our results. It is 
possible that the repeated natural scenes are less preferred because 
repetition leads to a habituation of attention toward the old stimu-
lus, and attention is thus biased toward the novel natural scenes. 
In conditions where there is no selection task during exposure, 
attention is less engaged, reducing the biasing effects on preference.
Preference for familiarity vs. novelty may be understood as an 
inverted-U function between preference and frequency of stimu-
lus exposure. For example, Zajonc et al. (1972) presented colorful 
paintings and varied the frequency of stimulus exposure between 
1, 2, 5, 10, and 25 times across subjects. After the exposure, subjects 
were asked to rate how much they liked each painting. Results 
showed that preference ratings increased with small numbers of 
exposures, but began to decline with larger numbers of exposures, 
eventually falling below the level of novel stimuli by the 25
th expo-
sure. If translated into our preference choice setting, the results 
indicate familiarity preference with lower numbers of exposures 
and novelty preference with higher numbers of exposures.
An intriguing aspect of that study is that the peak of the inverted-
U function was found to shift with the degree of similarity among 
the paintings that were exposed and rated. The paintings in the 
first experiment of Zajonc et al. (1972) were distinctively different 
from each other, and ratings peaked after one to two exposures. 
However, when multiple portions of the same painting were used 
to create a stimulus set with low visual variability, ratings peaked 
at 10 exposures or more, and the ratings never declined below the 
level of novel stimuli, even at 25 exposures. Likewise when they 
used photographs of faces, they found only familiarity preference, 
a   natural scene led to a preference bias away from that scene only 
when a selection task (whether an objective judgment or subjective 
preference judgment) was conducted during exposure. The results 
suggest that passive perceptual exposure without a task is sufficient 
to induce the familiarity preference for old faces, but a certain level 
of processing or selection seems to be required to induce the nov-
elty preference for new natural scenes. Thus the task-context of 
experience has different influences on preferences, and needs to be 
accounted for, to further understand the mechanisms underlying 
familiarity and novelty preferences.
One possibility is that experience drives familiarity preference 
for faces and novelty preference for natural scenes via different 
mechanisms. It is raised by the original finding of the preference 
segregation, i.e., the familiarity vs. the novelty preferences across 
object categories, in that the same experience can have opposite 
directions of influences on preference depending on the object 
type. Furthermore, the results in Experiment 1 that after passive 
exposure only familiar faces but not novel natural scenes were pre-
ferred indicate that the two types of preferences are influenced by 
the passively exposed experience differently.
Alternatively, the two types of preferences may involve the 
same or similar mechanism during exposure but are modulated 
by the depth of processing or involvement of selection process-
ing. One way to examine this issue is to make a direct comparison 
between Experiment 1 (passive exposure without judgment tasks) 
and Experiment 2 (objective judgment tasks) to test whether the 
task-context manipulation between the two experiments results 
in different effects. If different mechanisms are involved, different 
experience effects may be expected between the two experiments. 
The direct comparison actually did not reveal a statistical dif-
ference. However, the results may have been obscured by several 
factors. Just to name a few, the comparison was made between 
different groups of participants, it was based on only a few trials 
contributed by each participants, and the statistical power may 
be thus reduced.
Another important factor to obscure the results may be the 
different  objective  judgment  tasks  across  object  categories  in 
Experiment  2:  roundness  for  faces  and  color-temperature  for 
natural scenes. The stimulus attributes between faces and natural 
scenes are inherently different and this may constrain the objective 
judgment involvement to confound with object types. In order to 
make the objective task more natural and functionally relevant 
to each category, different types of objective judgment are imple-
mented with different object types. This inevitable choice of the 
task, however, made it difficult to directly compare the results and 
draw a strong conclusion.
Many explanations have been proposed to account for the 
tendency to prefer familiar items. For example, the perceptual flu-
ency account is that the ease of processing familiar items reduces 
cognitive load and thus causes relaxation and other responses 
related to positive affect (Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Bornstein 
and D’Agostino, 1994). Alternatively, Zajonc (2001) proposed a 
conditioning-based explanation, based on the absence of noxious 
events across the repeated stimuli. In this case, a positive affect, 
or safety signal, due to the absence of aversive consequences 
is associated with the repeated stimulus, establishing a linkage 
between the repeated stimulus and preference. There are also www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 43  |  7
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In summary, the current study showed how the task-context 
of  stimulus  exposure  affects  preference:  Familiar  faces  were 
preferred whenever the faces had previously been presented, 
whether those exposures occurred in the context of passive view-
ing or explicit comparisons. On the other hand, novel natural 
scenes became preferred only when the exposures occurred in 
the context of explicit comparisons. The comparison conducted 
during exposure did not have to be preference based – objective 
comparisons of a visual feature also elicit novelty preference. 
The overall results indicate that the formation of a preference 
for familiarity or novelty depends on interactions of several 
factors, such as task-context, processing level, stimulus type, 
and similarity.
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which continued to increase even up to 25 exposures. Altogether, 
the peak of the familiarity bias appears to shift later as the similarity 
between stimuli in the set increases. Thus, the pattern of familiarity 
and novelty preferences emerging from stimulus experience may 
be affected by interactions between type and similarity, which is 
consistent with the segregation in preferences across object catego-
ries, reported by Park et al. (2010) and duplicated in the current 
study. Faces are relatively similar to each other in terms of low-level 
visual features, as compared to those of natural scenes (see Park 
et al. (2010) for more detailed discussion), which might lead to 
early reversals toward novelty preference for natural images, and 
longer-term maintenance of familiarity preference for faces.
The emerging picture from the related studies and the current 
results is that difference between familiarity preference for faces and 
novelty preference for natural scenes may result from the interac-
tion between the task-context experience and object categories. For 
example, it could be possible that faces are biologically special and 
mutually similar, to form familiarity preference, as suggested by the 
conditioning with safety signal (e.g., Zajonc, 2001; de Vries et al., 
2010), and therefore the familiarity preference for faces is resistant 
to task-context experience manipulation. In contrast, natural scenes 
are with large varieties and more susceptible to processing depth 
or selection to affect preference formation.Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognitive Science    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 43  |  8
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